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World War II presented many changes in the work place for U.S. citizens on the
homefront, especially women. As American men were drafted in mass numbers
beginning in October of 1940, government officials called on civilians to mobilize and
maintain the homefront and wartime production. Women answered the call and found
numerous jobs in the industrial sector. As industrial jobs were filled, the farmfront
became desperate for farm hands. The Women’s Land Army (WLA) was created as a
supplementary organization to provide workers. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
established government recruitment agencies that used propaganda to encourage women
throughout the United States to participate in war jobs. War jobs consisted of
employment occupied predominantly by men before the United States joined WWII, and
then held by women for the duration of the war. The call for women to fill vacated jobs
that were previously held by men was a request that had never before been heard in such
strength by the American people. The United States used the labor of women in previous
wars, but not to the extent of that in WWII. Though their role in the work force was seen
as temporary, women experienced a newfound mobility in the labor market for the
duration of the conflict.
The contribution of women on the farmfront is an area of history that has been
much overlooked.1 History has recorded and heavily publicized the transformation that
took place in the industrial realm, but the call to maintain the farmfront has not been
thoroughly explored. Women, men, children, prisoners of war, and Americans of color
were recruited to help in farm production. The propaganda that was used to recruit farm
laborers was similar to industrial propaganda because both represented female labor as
being acceptable to the public by glamorizing the labor that women were engaging in for
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the duration. Propaganda also insinuated that the patriarchy remained intact on the
homefront by dramatizing war work as temporary and necessary for U.S. victory. Farm
labor propaganda differed from industrial propaganda because it focused more on the use
of family labor while industrial propaganda targeted the recruitment of adult workers.
The WLA developed in response to the farm labor shortage and need for
increased production. Gender prescriptions in other areas of the nation prohibited women
from entering the agricultural sector, which in turn led some regions to endure substantial
financial and agricultural losses. Gender prescriptions derived from the differences in
agricultural production. In the Midwest, it was less common for women to work in the
fields because of the use of technology and difference in agricultural production. It
therefore took awhile for the WLA to become widely accepted in this region of the
United States because manpower controlled the technology and heavy machinery that
was used to harvest corn, wheat, and livestock. 2 It was difficult for the farm men of the
Midwest to let women assume a role that had always been dominated by men due to their
roles in creating and working machinery. With the implementation of technology in the
twentieth century, “women left the fields for the house and barn and farm men planted,
cultivated, and harvested their crops with new machinery.” 3 The gender prescriptions
that were affiliated with technology and heavy machinery in the Midwest made it
difficult for people to accept women as farm workers. This is an interesting fact since
women were partaking in other war jobs involving machinery all over the United States.
As the war continued however, the farmers of the Midwest realized that women were
very necessary in maintaining farm production. This is because Midwestern farmers
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needed as many farm hands as possible and women had proved themselves as steady
workers.
The East and West coast had fewer gender prescriptions to overcome because
both did not rely on technology or heavy machinery in farm production. In these areas
fruit and vegetable crops were often handpicked. Women were therefore a part of farm
labor before the war began, and so women’s participation in the WLA was more easily
accepted on the East and West coast.
Propaganda was used as persuasion on the homefront during World War II to gain
society’s approval of women working war jobs. Propaganda misrepresented the typical
woman that worked the war jobs by portraying her as young, inexperienced, white, and of
a middle-class background. The majority of the women that worked during World War II
did not fit this description. Of the eighteen million women that worked outside the home
during the war, about six million of these women worked for the first time. 4 In other
words, women that had previous experience in the workforce comprised two-thirds of the
wartime labor force. Three out of the four new women workers were married. 5 The war
mobilized women for the labor market, allowing women to more freely move from job to
job with opportunities in defense industries and support services, which also opened up
the farmfront. Though women were misrepresented in wartime propaganda, the
combined efforts of the government and media during WWII did heavily influence the
participation of women in war jobs. Propaganda made women feel that it was not only
okay for them to work war jobs, it was necessary to ensure U.S. victory.
Historians Maria Diedrich and Dorothea Fischer-Hornung edited an anthology
entitled Women and War to revise and emphasize the role of women in wartime history. 6
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They believe that HERstory has been misinterpreted through HIStory. The two historians
point out that official representations of history show that life on the homefront was
victorious for women. Women experienced victory on the homefront because they were
able to prove themselves as being just as capable and equally fit for the labor force as
men were. This fact alone can be considered as a victory for women. Diedrich and
Fischer-Hornung assert that propaganda in newspapers supposedly portrayed pictures of
women of all ages, classes, and races transformed in their new roles doing men’s work.
After making the claim that a variety of women were well represented, the two historians
suggest that Rosie the Riveter was a common tool for propaganda. Rosie the Riveter
represented a mythological human being, rather than the majority of women that worked
as riveters. She portrayed the industrious female worker as glamorous, efficient, and
sexually attractive. Diedrich and Fischer-Hornung indicate that the everyday reality of
women’s lives on the homefront lacked this acclaimed glamour. 7
Diedrich and Fischer-Hornung do not deny that the war brought objective changes
to the lives of women. The two historians believe that while the situation of women
changed on the homefront, female subordination was retained through war efforts.
Female subordination was emphasized through propaganda and its emphasis on war labor
being temporary. Propaganda insinuated that the rightful place for women was in the
domestic sphere and that their role in war jobs was simply for the duration. The two
historians demonstrate that most women were assigned to low labor categories earning
only sixty-five percent of their male colleagues pay. It appears that this fact was
reiterated even in times of extreme labor shortages. Diedrich and Fischer-Hornung
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conceptualize that women’s work at home enabled the man at the front to do the “real”
work.8
As demonstrated in her book, American Women and World War II, historian
Doris Weatherford maintains the belief that World War II contained many ironies, among
them is the liberating effect it had on women. 9 Weatherford points out that state laws
were passed during the 1930’s that banished women from jobs, asserting that a woman’s
place was in the home. Once the United States joined WWII though, Weatherford claims
that women were coaxed out of the home and into the workforce. President Roosevelt
called women the last “labor reserve.” Weatherford claims that during WWII, women
worked better jobs than they had previously engaged in. Historians Nikki Lockhart and
Jenna Pergande add in their work entitled “Women Who Answered the Call: World War
II as a Turning Point for Women in the Workforce” that the introduction of women to
men’s work created a newfound independence. 10 The two historians assess that women
initially joined the labor force to support their men abroad, but in the process of doing so,
women discovered that their roles were not as limited as they had previously conceived.
Amy Kesselman in Fleeting Opportunities: Women Shipyard Workers in Portland
and Vancouver During World War II and Reconversion, explores the experiences of
women who worked in Portland and Vancouver shipyards. Kesselman believes that the
“meaning of war work for the thousands of women who worked in war industries—
women who brought with them a variety of expectations and experiences—has been
obscured for decades by the prevailing image of Rosie the Riveter reluctantly discarding
her apron and, thinking tearfully of her menfolk in the service, joining the industrial
workforce to do her bit.” 11 This statement indicates that the Rosie the Riveter image used
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in propaganda was not an accurate representation of the women in the labor force.
Kesselman explains that most women took war jobs because of higher wages and new
opportunities. Kesselman indicates that war propaganda communicated a double
message to the public. Women engaged in new challenges for the war effort, but they
were not to forget their true identity as wives, girlfriends, and mothers. 12 She also
explains that after the war ended, Rosie the Riveter became a nostalgic image.
Kesselman further elaborates by explaining that the double message also retained sex
segregation in war jobs through allocating only certain jobs to women.
Stephanie A. Carpenter explores an area of history that she perceives to be
neglected, the role of women on the agricultural front during World War II. Carpenter
believes that the existing scholarship of women during World War II “ignores their
presence in the fields although their presence in the workplace, defense industries, and
society and the changes this brought to American life in the 1940s has been studied
extensively.” 13 Carpenter maintains that women’s work in the Women’s Land Army
contributed in important ways to the nation’s defense during World War II. Production
levels would have been impossible to maintain, had not women helped out on the farm
fields. Carpenter claims that through examining the many different interpretations of
women’s place on the homefront, scholars have not addressed the importance of
agricultural labor. Carpenter states that recently the amount of scholarship devoted to the
contribution of agriculture on the homefront during World War II has increased, but
women are still neglected due to historians focusing on the labor of “convicts, interned
Japanese Americans, Mexican nationals, and prisoners of war.” 14
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Carpenter indicates that a shortage of farm labor existed during World War II, due
to the need for workers in other job areas. How did the Oregon agriculture sector
respond to the shortage of farm labor? Oregon’s farmfront successfully met production
demands during World War II with the help of propaganda that was implemented
throughout the United States; this propaganda encouraged women to show their
patriotism by working in the agricultural sector which was desperately in need of labor
due to the successful recruitment of women to the industrial sector. Propaganda was
therefore used throughout the United States to recruit workers to fill all vacated jobs.
The labor shortages that existed on the farmfront in 1941 and 1942 led states to
search for labor relief for their farmers. 15 In August of 1941, a subcommittee of the
Department of Agriculture’s Labor Committee suggested that “to ensure a successful
harvest and adequate food supply for 1942, women would need to be recruited to work in
the fields, planting, cultivating, and harvesting fruit and vegetable crop.” 16 In July of
1942, it was acknowledged in Oregon that women would have to be employed to satisfy
the agriculture demand due to the decrease in farm labor. Training classes for wartime
farm production were established and held around the state to introduce nonfarm women
and other workers to the skills of farm labor. The aim of the war production training
classes was to provide “an additional supply of year-round and seasonal agricultural
workers as well as help farmers increase the efficiency of their own equipment and the
efficiency of their sometimes inexperienced workers.” 17
Between the years of 1940 and 1943, “the number of farm workers in the United
States noticeably decreased because of armed forces manpower requirements and
competition with higher paying jobs in the defense industries.” 18 By 1943, the nation’s
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farm labor had become extremely problematic due to people leaving farms to seek other
war work that paid better. The U.S. government therefore founded the Women’s Land
Army in April of 1943, which was an extension of the Emergency Farm Labor Program.
The Emergency Farm Labor Program was established as a means to provide agricultural
labor to the nation’s farmers. 19 The primary goal of the national WLA was to recruit as
many women as possible to the fields. The WLA was composed of farm and nonfarm
women who were called to fill jobs that had been vacated by those who went to fill jobs
in other support areas. At different rates across the country, the contribution of the WLA
was regarded as highly valuable by the public. The WLA recruitment program strove to
secure seasonal workers. Recruitment strategies and implementation of the Women’s
Land Army in the United States during World War II led Oregon to be one of the
strongest agriculture forces in the nation.
After the United States entered the war, “propagandists labored to convince farm
women that increased participation in field work, were major components of the
American war strategy.” 20 At first, many of the farm hands belonged to women of rural
origins due to the Women’s Bureau advocating that “women should be recruited only in
those areas that desperately needed additional labor, and only women capable of doing
hard physical labor should be considered.” 21 The Women’s Bureau was a United States
federal agency that was established in 1920 to promote the rights and welfare of working
women. Rural farm women gave the greatest contribution to wartime farm work. Almost
every farm woman did additional work by taking on the majority of tasks found on a
farm. This fact separates farm women from the rest of women war workers. Farm
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women were bestowed with more responsibilities because they had worked on the farms
before the war, therefore they possessed the necessary knowledge and experience.
The coastal regions of the United States proved able to recruit more workers than
the Middle West. This is due to the variation of production in each region. The Middle
West was dependent upon “technology and machinery; therefore, Midwestern farm
women were viewed as ‘reserve labor’ for the field and primarily performed household
and related work.” 22 The farms of the East and the West coasts were comprised of truck
and fruit farms while the Middle West was more technology oriented due to its grain
agriculture. As the war continued though, the Midwestern farmers began to realize that
they had no choice but to open up their fields to the women, including the Women’s Land
Army. 23 The farmlands on the West coast had been traditionally worked by women
before World War II. It therefore did not take much effort to persuade Oregon producers
that “women made ideal agricultural laborers.”24 Extensive recruitment was therefore not
needed to entice Oregon producers to let women continue in their traditional role of
female farm labor.
Each state had an extension service that administered the WLA. After the passage
of Public Law 45, Oregon state responsibility for the WLA was given to the Oregon State
College Extension Service’s nutrition specialist, Mabel Mack. 25 Public Law 45, also
known as the Farm Labor Supply Appropriation Act, was approved on April 29, 1943 by
the 78th U.S. Congress to “assist farmers in producing vital food by making labor
available at the time and place it was most needed.” 26 Later, the U.S. Congress extended
the effective period of the measure to remain intact until June 30, 1947. An article
released October 26, 1942 in the Oregonian stated that Oregon agriculture was being hard
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hit for both skilled and seasonal labor “because other work and the call to arms have
drained agricultural manpower and seasonal help.” 27 Oregon was “well above the
national average for rapidly advancing farm labor pay rates.” 28 This fact contributed to
Oregon’s success in recruiting women farm workers.
The Bracero Program was also created under the approval of Public Law 45. This
program allowed the importation of male agricultural workers from Mexico. The
majority of these workers found labor in the Northwest. The program was created by the
federal government to guarantee “a cheap and organized labor supply during wartime.” 29
The braceros lived under poor conditions and insufficient food. Between the years 1943
and 1947, “the United States government contracted with approximately 47,000 bracero
agricultural laborers in Mexico to work in the northwestern states of Idaho, Oregon, and
Washington.”30 The amount of women that worked on Oregon farms far exceeded the
amount of braceros that worked the land. This is because when braceros complained of
poor working conditions and low wages, “northwestern farmers searched for another
source of cheap labor.” 31 Women oftentimes comprised the other ‘source of cheap labor’.
The motives of braceros and women working on the farmfront differed. Mexican
men came to work on the farm fields to “earn sufficient money to take back to Mexico”
while women worked on the farm out of patriotic obligations. 32 Carpenter states that the
experiences of the women involved in the WLA “were about patriotism and success, not
about wages, prestige, or popularity. 33 The contribution of braceros was vital to farm
production, but braceros were perceived by their employers as easily replaceable if they
chose to speak out against working conditions. Women worked primarily in the fields to
help with the war effort, not to support entire families.
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From 1943-1947, close to 135,000 women were placed to work on Oregon
farmland. The WLA “accounted for the largest group of wartime agricultural workers”
within the Emergency Farm Labor Program. 34 The supervisors of the extension services
were in charge of planning recruitment campaigns, organizing worker camps, providing
training courses, opening child care centers, and making the WLA friendly and
acceptable to all workers. 35 The WLA endeavored to create cohesiveness among the
rural and urban work forces through “placing urban women on rural farms.” 36 Urban
women were referred to as nonfarm women while women that worked or lived on farms
before the war were referred to as farm women. A prejudice against nonfarm women
existed across the country. This prejudice was based upon farmers worrying that
nonfarm “women would be more concerned with appearances than with working.” 37 The
WLA helped eliminate previous stereotypes that insinuated urban women were useless,
due to the lack of large machinery during the war. 38 Farmers began to acknowledge that
female labor was necessary in order to meet the wartime demand for agricultural
products. Carpenter states that “farmers abandoned traditional labor and stereotypical
social practices to conform to legislated wartime measures.” 39
The Oregon WLA was able to create and enforce county programs during its first
year of administration in 1943. The United States Department of Agriculture and the
Women’s Land Army recruited university students and faculty, working women, and
homemakers to assist in agricultural production. Farm and nonfarm women readily
volunteered to work in Oregon’s WLA. Between 1943 and 1945, the WLA placed more
than seventy-eight thousand women on farms in Oregon. 40 Some of these women
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worked full-time, some part-time, and some would just work one to two weeks out of the
year.
Although Oregon producers were easily swayed to take on workers from the
Women’s Land Army, the state retained the mentality that if a man was available for the
same work, he would be hired over a woman. Housewives constituted a large portion of
Oregon’s Land Army, specifically in Marion County. They worked under a service
entitled ‘Housewife Special’ and were transported by bus from their homes to the fields,
returning at the end of the workday back to the home. 41 After the establishment of the
WLA, Marion County called for over ten thousand women to work on numerous fruit,
vegetable, and hop farms between the months of June and October. An article in the
Oregon City Courier declared that “women from 18 to 25 years are the best pickers,
doing a better job than men of any age.” 42

Figure 1: “Women Board a “Housewife Special” Bus to Go Help Save Marion County’s Bean Crop, 1944”
Oregon State Archives, Oregon State University Online Exhibit,
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/osu/osuwla.html

Many of the women that worked on the farm front worked part-time in the fields
while maintaining their homes. Figure 1 portrays a group of women from Marion County
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that worked the “Housewife Special.” These women generally worked from 8:30AM to
3:00PM, “which enabled the busy housewife to do her home work.”43
The propaganda that was used to recruit women to the farmfront utilized
patriotism as a means to motivate women to help whenever they had time. Urban women
would commonly work their primary war job and then go and help on the farm fields,
especially during high peak harvest seasons. The majority of “urban nonfarm
participants worked during their one or two-week vacations from their full-time jobs and
did not possess the means or the inclination to spend a summer on a farm.” 44 Although
these women did not work on the fields that much, their contributions still qualified them
as members of the WLA.
The federal government used propaganda to influence the way that people thought
about the war. The U.S. realized that in order to win, it had to produce the resources that
were needed to maintain stability. Propaganda was therefore published in many forms
throughout the nation. Propaganda is defined as the “expression of opinions or actions
carried out deliberately by individuals or groups with a view to influencing the opinions
or actions of other individuals or groups for the predetermined ends and through
psychological manipulations.” 45 It “contains truth as well as half-truths, exaggerations,
and outright lies.” 46 Workers for the WLA were recruited through “state conferences,
informational programs, letters, and a national propaganda campaign.” 47
War affiliated propaganda that was implemented throughout the nation suggested
that the United States could not obtain victory without women doing their part on the
homefront. This suggestion is justifiable and most likely true. To recruit women war
workers, the government issued propaganda through movies, billboards, posters,
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magazines, newspapers, window displays, and the radio with hopes of getting women out
of the home and into war jobs. Not everyone felt that women should leave the home for
the workforce but propaganda convinced many that it was suitable for women to engage
in war jobs, on a temporary basis, “for the duration.” Women’s war jobs included work
in defense and support services such as on farms, in steel mills, ship yards, foundries,
lumber mills, aircraft factories, offices, hospitals, and daycare centers. 48 By working
these jobs during the war “for the first time in their lives, many women performed jobs
that were viewed by the public as necessary and valuable.” 49 Although these jobs were
deemed as necessary and valuable by the public, the work that women did was not taken
seriously because it was only temporary. Many of these job categories after the war,
most of the workers were once again male.
The War Manpower Commission (WMC) and the Office of War Information
(OWI) were powerful U.S. government agencies aimed towards the recruitment of
women war workers. The WMC was founded in April of 1942 by President Roosevelt
“to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the nation’s
manpower in the prosecution of the war.” 50 FDR appointed Paul V. McNutt as the head
of the commission. The WMC developed its program on the basis of setting standards
for war workers. Married women with young children were not heavily recruited for the
majority of war jobs because of the standards that existed in mid-20th century American
society. It was one thing for single or married women to partake in manpower jobs, but
for mothers with young children, the only suitable place for them was in the home
nurturing their young ones. The Census Bureau made a detailed analysis and concluded,
“married women without children under ten would be the best source of workers for the

16

duration of the war.” 51 The WMC recognized the fact that it had to overcome longstanding social principles to “sell war jobs to women who had never worked outside the
home before, and to their husbands, bosses, and coworkers.”52 The commission made it
their policy to “employ young mothers as a last resort, and child care facilities were kept
to a minimum throughout the war.”53 The WMC did its best to establish the image of
war workers as emergency stand-ins. 54
In June 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt created the OWI two months after the birth
of the WMC. The OWI gave strong support to the established WMC. Roosevelt
appointed Elmer H. Davis to head the coordination of disseminating war information by
setting guidelines for consumer advertisement, feature films and newsreels, posters and
billboards, and articles in newspapers and magazines. 55 The OWI therefore became in
charge of implementing propaganda based upon the standards set by the WMC. The
OWI was responsible for “selling the idea that women were able and obligated to engage
in war work.”56
The recruitment approach of the agricultural sector differed from the rest of the
workforce propaganda. Farm labor propaganda did not exclude the recruitment of
Americans of color, the aged, or children. However, children could only be utilized for
farm labor with parental consent. Organizations such as the American Farm Bureau
Federation, the Grange, and other agricultural organizations disagreed with the use of
white women for farm work and were more willing to “use men and black women for
farm labor, but not urban, middle-class, white women without agriculture expertise.” 57
This fact contradicts the propaganda that represented the typical women that worked
other war jobs. In Oregon, farm labor eventually came to consist of “urban youth and
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women, soldiers, white collar professionals, displaced Japanese-Americans, returning war
veterans, workers from other states, migrant workers from Mexico and Jamaica, and even
German prisoners-of-war.” 58
Although propaganda falsely portrayed the social characteristics of the average
war worker, it awakened opportunity and need for action in women from all
backgrounds. The increase in female labor supply during the war caused both female and
male wages to decrease. 59 The advance in female labor participation led to a greater
inequality of earnings “between male college and high school graduates but reduced
earnings inequality between male graduates of high school versus eighth-grade
graduates.”60 The labor of women therefore raised the bar for male workers. Education
was prized by society because it set men apart from women; this is because women were
less prone to seeking a higher education during this time.
Propaganda implemented by the OWI suggested strongly that though the labor of
women was needed, war jobs were simply temporary. Since most women that entered the
workforce had been in it before the war, this was a devastating reality. It was also
disconcerting to the new workers that enjoyed their jobs. New and experienced war
workers during the duration experienced a newfound independence. Women began to
realize their full potential and capabilities. The famous Rosie the Riveter poster with the
declaration, “We Can Do It!” summed up the war mentalities of women doing men’s
work. In terms of farm labor, the employment of women "in agriculture did not end with
World War II."61 This is because women were already a part of the agriculture sector
before the war. The pay of most war jobs was better than the majority of farm wages.
Across the board though women were still paid less than men were for doing the same
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work. Farm labor became depleted due to the higher wages offered in other war jobs,
which is why organizations such as the Women’s Land Army were created.
The following five figures represent some of the different types of propaganda
that were implemented in newspapers and magazines to recruit women to the industrial
and agricultural sectors. All figures retain the patriarchy and family structure by
insinuating that the labor of women is temporary and simply for the war effort. Figures 4
and 5 suggest that the participation of labor on the farmfront can be done as a family
effort. Figures 2 and 6 promote women to work their preference of labor, including farm
work as an option. Figure 3 portrays the various tasks of farm labor that were desired of
women to perform. All of the figures use patriotism as a motive for women working war
jobs.
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Figure 2: “The More Women at Work, the Sooner We Win!” World War II Poster Collection,
Northwestern University Library Online Exhibit,
http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govpub/collections/wwii-posters/img/ww1645-38.jpg

Figure 2 is an example of the World War II propaganda that was implemented by
the Office of War Information in 1943. It utilizes patriotism as a means to motivate
women to join the labor force in various areas of work. The poster can also be perceived
as an attempt to appease the fears of society because it emphasized the fact that the war
cannot be won without the labor of women on the homefront. Women’s war work was
necessary and patriotic, but not revolutionary. The woman used in the poster is also
attractive, physically fit, white, and appears to be of middle-class background.

Figure 3: “Pitch in and Help: Join the Women’s Land Army of the U.S. Crop Corps” World War II Poster
Collection, Northwestern University Library Online Exhibit,
http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govpub/collections/wwii-posters/img/ww0870-02.jpg

Figure 3 is a classic example of the propaganda that was used to recruit women to
be a part of the WLA. It was displayed in the Extension Service’s monthly catalog in
1944. The poster portrays six women doing various farm tasks that needed to be done
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due to the lack of male labor. The women are dressed in different versions of the WLA
uniforms. Carpenter states that the “WLA’s administration set wages, designed a
uniform, prescribed safety precautions, and procured housing for the women workers.”62
Most women did not wear the uniforms because they had to pay for them with their own
money. The uniforms represent the cohesiveness that the government was trying to
create among women farm workers. The uniforms also have patriotic meaning because
they portray women as being a part of an actual army that is fighting for a collective
cause. Although the women are in uniform, they are still wearing shoes with heals. The
shoes represent the preservation of feminism on the farmfront. Like the propaganda that
was used for industrial labor, the women are white, physically fit, and appear to be of
middle-class background.

Figure 4: “Plant a Victory Garden” World War II Poster Collection, Northwestern University Library
Online Exhibit, http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govpub/collections/wwii-posters/img/ww1645-38.jpg

Figure 4 is an advertisement that was distributed by the Office of War
Information through its monthly catalog in 1943. This poster exhibits how the farmfront
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not only recruited women to work in the fields, but also men and children. The woman is
working with a skirt and seamed stockings, which proves that it was important to the
public that women still retain their prescribed clothing attire while doing men’s work.
The man and boy are dressed in overalls and the boy is showing his patriotism by
wearing a military cap. This poster exhibits the preservation of the patriarchy and the
importance of the family working as a unit for the war cause. The garden promotes
victory because the soldiers can not successfully fight without food, as spoken through
the statement in the poster ‘our food is fighting’.

Figure 5: “Town Folks”, Oregon State Archives, Oregon State University Online Exhibit,
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/osu/osuothwork.html

Figure 5 is an example of the propaganda that was used to recruit retired citizens
to the farm fields. The retired citizens that worked on the farmfront usually had field
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experience but were oftentimes from urbanized areas. The poster emphasizes that the
United States Crop Corps desired “Town Folks with Farm Experience” to work in the
fields. Figure 5 represents an actual recruitment poster that was used in Oregon in 1945
to gather more farm hands on the farmfront. This poster is especially important because
it portrays how women from all age groups worked on the farmfront. The poster can also
be described as retaining the patriarchy because the wife is holding on to her husband’s
arm with a pleasant grin while he is taking off his retirement jacket getting ready to work.

Figure 6: I’ve Found the Job Where I Fit Best!” World War II Poster Collection, Northwestern University
Library Online Exhibit, http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govpub/collections/wwiiposters/img/ww1646-40.jpg

Figure 6 portrays the alleged freedom that women had on the homefront during
WWII through emphasizing the various opportunities that women had in industry,
agriculture, and business. It was distributed by the Office of War Information in 1943.
The woman in the figure appears to be a riveter. She is attractive, white and most likely
of a middle class background. The statement ‘I’ve found the job where I fit best!’ shows
how propaganda tried to make women and society feel like what women were doing was
okay. The poster portrays the supposed liberation that women had on the homefront by
finding her perfect war job.
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Successful propaganda creates a strong emotional appeal that is based on the
tension between truth and falsehood. The propaganda that was used and has been
remembered by society did not accurately portray the realities of life for the majority of
the women that worked war jobs. Two female myths during World War II are
remembered through the majority of history texts. The first myth has already been
mentioned which is the predominant suggestion that women workers were white,
inexperienced, young, and from the middle-class. Government “posters, films, and
advertising showed white middle-class housewives laying aside their card games in order
to help out for the duration.” 63 This indeed was not reality. Though some women did
join the work force to help the war effort, most of the women that worked during World
War II were former service and domestic workers. The second myth concludes that
women “entered the workforce out of patriotic motives and eagerly left to start families
and resume full-time homemaking” at the end of the war. 64 The majority of histories on
WWII and work focus on the industrial sector and the changes that took place while the
activities of those that worked “in agricultural labor,” according to Carpenter, “have been
largely ignored.” 65 The contributions of women on the farmfront were different from the
industrial sector because the initial women that joined the WLA already had experience
on the fields and continued in their roles on the fields after the war ended.
All war work was heavily glamorized and feminized; this was to make the labor
of women not their own. Society was uncomfortable with women doing what was
traditionally men’s work, so advertising portrayed war work in a feminized manner.
Propaganda demonstrated this by portraying supposed connections between war jobs and
housework. Advertising reassured its viewers that women war workers were
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participating in work that had domestic relations. Skilled factory work was distorted as
being comparable to housework. 66 A few examples used in advertising schemes include:
a woman cutting the pattern of aircraft parts rather than cutting the lines of a dress, a
woman cooking gears to reduce the tension after use instead of baking a cake, and a
woman operating a drill press, as easily as she operated a juice extractor in her own
kitchen. 67 Farm propaganda did not compare the work that women were doing to
domestic tasks. It rather declared that farm labor was an expansion of what women were
previously doing before the war began.
Some World War II industrial propaganda discouraged mothers from working,
suggesting that participating in the workforce caused unhappiness in family life because
their children were not being properly nurtured. An Oakland newspaper used an add with
a baby’s face on it and the slogan “Your Baby or Your Job” to emphasize the importance
of women staying at home with their children. 68 In addition, propaganda suggested that
women working jobs that had been designated for males by society did not upset the
patriarchy. The WMC ensured the public that soldiers were proud of their working
wives. Images such as a WMC poster picturing a soldier with his hands on his hardworking wife’s shoulders as she declares, “I’m Proud… my husband wants me to do my
part,” encouraged society that it was all right for women to work because they
supposedly had the support of their fighting husbands. 69
The gender hierarchy of the United States was highly challenged during World
War II. Propaganda reassured the public that women’s labor was a part of the war effort.
Propaganda stressed that the war could not be won without women doing their part on the
homefront. Women were very rarely given supervisory responsibilities or placed in
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executive positions. The patriarchy was retained on the homefront, minorities remained
inferior, and the rightful place of the women remained in the home. Though women took
on jobs that had always been designated to males, they usually did not receive equal pay.
For the most part, economic and social equality was not achieved on the
homefront during the war. Women generally received less pay for doing the same labor
as men did. In 1942, the National War Labor Board announced a policy of “equal pay for
equal work.”70 Employers found ways around this policy by setting up “women’s
jobs.” 71 Through re-labeling work, women’s wages were kept lower than men’s were.
An example of the re-labeling of work is an instance that took place in the automotive
industry, General Motors. 72 Categories were substituted as “heavy” for “male” work and
“light” for “female” work. In other plants, women “were placed in separate job
classifications such as “helper trainee” instead of “mechanic learner.” 73 The government
ruled that labor, which was historically designated to women, was admissible to unequal
treatment. A survey taken in 1942 by the Women’s Bureau of the Labor Department
discovered that “of 18 major ammunition plants, only three paid the sexes equally.” 74 In
1944, the average woman’s salary was $31.21 a week and the average salary for men was
$54.65 a week. 75 After the war the WMC and OWI recognized the possibility of women
not wanting to give up war jobs so they used propaganda to convince them that it was
best and to re-emphasize that the woman’s rightful place was in the home.
On the farm fields, sex and age affected the amount of money that people made
because wages were based upon the amount pounds that the workers gathered. Younger
and stronger muscles were able to pick more fruits and vegetables than weaker and older
bodies. After the U.S. federal government began to nationalize the need for farm laborers
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in 1943, the wages and production of farm labor increased. The average daily earnings of
Oregon strawberry pickers in 1943 were $1.41, $2.00 in 1944, and $2.47 in 1945. 76 This
equates to weekly earnings based upon a seven-day work week to be $9.87 in 1943,
$14.00 in 1944, and $17.29 in 1945. These wages prove to be drastically less than
industrial wages.
The WLA combined the efforts of farm and nonfarm women to meet agricultural
demands of the United States. When the war ended, nonfarm women reverted back to
their old lives and farm women stayed on the farms. For the majority of women that
were forced back into domestic positions at the end of the war, their liberating
experiences were retained but remained unspoken. This is recognizable when examining
statistics of the number of women that were married workers after the war ended. In
1947, there were 7.5 million married women workers and in 1952, there were 10.4
million married women workers. 77 This indicates that the number of women workers that
were married did rise after the war, which further suggests that a significant amount of
women were not willing to give up the independence that they had experienced through
working war jobs. More than seventy-five percent of women in war jobs indicated that
they intended on keeping their jobs when the war ended. 78 This same percentage also
represented the rate of which women were laid off in comparison to the rate of men laid
off at the end of the war. 79 The bulk of jobs that women worked after the war were
unfortunately jobs that had been designated by society as suitable for women. In the
agricultural sector, expansion that occurred within during the war, as well as outmigration from, caused the industry to hire more women in postwar years. 80
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At the end of the war, propaganda was used to encourage women in other areas of
labor to give their jobs back to veterans. A poster portraying a riveter handing over her
drill to a veteran is an example of the propaganda that was used. 81 Women who
continued to work after the war were “critically portrayed in the popular culture as
selfishly and willingly causing divorce, juvenile delinquency, crime, and other problems
facing the post war population.” 82 Guilt was used through propaganda as manipulation to
get women to work during the war, as well as to not work after the war. Despite the
postwar rhetoric that existed, the 1950s witnessed an increasing number of women
working farm and field labor. 83 Many women felt ambivalence over U.S. victory because
with the return of men, women returned to the home. Their newfound independence
became a nostalgic memory. The majority of women that desired to keep working were
forced back into domestic based jobs. Farm labor differed from the rest of war labor
because it was not new to the rural female sex. This fact most likely contributed to the
sentiment that existed after the war, which was lenient to women continuing to work in
the fields. Farm women did gain responsibilities through the war that they had never
before been subject to. The presence of women on the fields during World War II proved
to be unifying and long lasting.
Life on the U.S. homefront was a pivotal experience for American women war
workers. These women were enticed through WMC and OWI propaganda to show their
patriotism by working war jobs to help the United States win the war. Propaganda
inaccurately portrayed the average woman worker, claiming that she was young,
inexperienced, white, and middle-class. The majority of war workers were poor whites,
Americans of color, and experienced through years of working domestic jobs, including
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farm work. These women engaged in war jobs to receive better pay, although they were
usually paid less for doing the same work as men did. Propaganda encouraged women at
the end of the war to hand their jobs back over to the men. Women were of course
overjoyed that their loved ones were returning from war; but they also possessed
conflicting feelings over returning to their domestic lives. The patriarchy was upheld
during the war, though millions of men were gone overseas. Propaganda feminized the
labor of women in order to encourage society that women were capable of working, and
to downplay their labors by comparing their work to kitchen tasks. War work performed
by women was re-labeled so that employers could get away with paying women less for
their labor. Society was condescending to the labor of women as war workers, yet a huge
doorway was opened to women through War World II. After the war, many farm women
continued to work the fields during peak production while simultaneously doing
household, childcare, and farm chores.
Diedrich and Fischer-Hornung are correct in their claim that female subordination
was retained through war efforts. By women working jobs that were simply “for the
duration” the patriarchy remained intact. The propaganda that was used to recruit women
to work war jobs strove to retain the feminine characteristics that women possessed prior
to the war. Kesselman accurately indicates that society did not want women to forget
their feminine identities through their new experiences that derived from the war effort.
Women however discovered a new element of themselves through working on the
homefront during World War II. As Nikki Lockhart and Jenna Pergande suggest, the
introduction of women to men’s work created a newfound independence that was
experienced by many women. As Carpenter indicates that propaganda, which was
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implemented nationwide to recruit women to work industrial jobs, created a lack of
workers on the farmfront. The role that the Women’s Land Army played during World
War II has indeed been much overlooked due to the presence of women working in other
industries. The WLA did however gain recognition and prominence nationwide. With
its implementation, Oregon easily recruited women to work in the fields. History has
neglected a group of women that had success in the labor force during, as well as after,
the war. The Women’s Land Army successfully recruited women to do their part on the
farmfront, especially in Oregon. Although propaganda portrayed the majority of war
labor as temporary, its affect on women has proven to be long lasting in all areas of work.
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